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Minsk Agreement Ukraine Text

The new package, commonly referred to as Minsk II, has been criticised as “extremely complicated” and “extremely fragile” and very similar to the failure of the Minsk protocol. [5] [34] [35] The New York Times reported that the plan contained “some Tripwirs,” such as the non-delimitation of control of the city of Debaltseve, which was the scene of the most violent fighting at the time of the plan.” [5] [36] Following the Minsk talks, Chancellor Merkel, President Hollande and President Poroshenko attended a European Union (EU) summit in Brussels. [37] At the summit, participants in Minsk briefed EU heads of state and government on the talks. During the briefing, they said that President Putin had tried to delay by ten days the establishment of a ceasefire to force Ukrainian troops to abandon their positions in Debaltseve. For his part, President Putin said that The defenders of Debaltseve were surrounded and that the separatists expected them to “lay down their arms and stop resisting”. [37] Andrei Kolesnikov, a journalist from Kommersant, wrote that the implementation of the ceasefire in Debaltseve depends on whether or not the Ukrainian armed forces are encirclement: “Does it exist above all? Vladimir Putin insisted that there is [encirclement] and that it will be strange if a ceasefire agreement is reached, if it is not violated: those in the boiler will certainly try to get by; Those who have cooked this kettle will try to pick up the foam.” [38] The text of the protocol consists of twelve points:[7] A second agreement in Minsk on 12 February produced a ceasefire which, for the time being, is mainly, and measures to de-escalate the conflict. Many officials on the ground and in Kiev, Moscow and the West nevertheless believe that the war in eastern Ukraine could resume in a few weeks. If the need exists, much will depend on the quality of the best commanders on both sides. The Ukrainian army is involved in a command crisis that the country`s leaders do not seem to want to admit or address.

For the separatist rebels, Moscow`s command and control could give them the advantage in all the new fighting. Meanwhile, President Petro Poroshenko is facing criticism from his Western allies over the slow pace of reforms, opposition from the political establishment, as he tries to pass laws prescribed by the Minsk agreement and a steady stream of complaints from Donetsk and Moscow that the measures do not go far enough. With the 2015 Ukrainian municipal elections scheduled for 25 October, DPR leader Alexander Zakhartchenko adopted a decree on 2 July ordering the sending election on 18 October. [68] He stated that this measure was “in accordance with the Minsk agreements”. [69] According to Zakharchenko, this meant that the DPR had “started to implement the Minsk agreements independently”. [69] Zakharchenko stated that the elections would be held “on the basis of The Ukrainian Law on the Status of Temporary Self-Domination of Certain Districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions”, as they were not in contradiction with the DPR Constitution and laws. [69] The Ukrainian Parliament approved on 17 March a law on the “special status” for the Donbass, as stipulated by Minsk II [56] Later, in 2019, the Ukrainian Parliament voted on Thursday to extend the rules providing for limited autonomy to separatist-controlled eastern regions, a precondition for a five-year settlement of the conflict. [57] The law was immediately criticized by Ukrainian politicians, separatist leaders and the Russian government.

The president of the Radical Party, Oleg Lyaschko, said that the law was “a vote in favour of the de facto recognition of the Russian occupation in the Donbass”. Parliament`s Deputy Speaker Andriy Paroubiy said the law was “not for Putin or for the occupiers” but to show Europe that Ukraine was ready to stick to Minsk II. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said the law was a “severe deviation from the Minsk agreements.” [56] Representatives of LPR and DPR stated that the law was a “unilateral” amendment to Minsk II and that this amendment invalidated the